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ABSTRACT   This short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring 
policy in a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment with an underground 
sector. More precisely, from a social welfare standpoint, two options are available to the policy 
maker: s/he may either substitute a tighter monitoring with a higher penalty or enforce both a 
higher taxation and an increased monitoring. 
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The interdependence of taxation and monitoring in a matching framework 
The study of the effects of economic policies such as taxation, monitoring and punishment on 
the size of the underground economy and the level of involuntary unemployment is the 
focus of matching-type models with an underground sector.1 However, a great many of 
these models do not discuss how the policy parameters can be optimally set by a policy 
maker who wants to maximize social output (shadow employment produces positive added 
value so some tolerance should be expected from an efficiency standpoint). As an exception, 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) show that the optimal taxation problem does not affect the policy-
maker’s choice with respect to the optimal monitoring of underground activities, whereas 
optimal taxation is affected by the optimal choice of monitoring (the ‘separability result’). 
Instead, this paper shows that the optimal monitoring problem is also affected by the 
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optimal choice of taxation. Precisely, there are two options available to the policy maker: 
s/he may either substitute a tighter monitoring with a higher penalty or enforce both a 
higher taxation and an increased monitoring. 
To make our point as simply as possible, we consider a basic matching framework à 
la Pissarides (2000) with a continuum of homogeneous workers of measure one. The creation 
of employment occurs in a labour market with matching frictions. As usual (see Pissarides, 
2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), an aggregate matching function is used to summarize 
these frictions. Precisely, the number of job matches formed per unit of time is ( )vumm ,= , 
where u  is the number of unemployed workers and v  is the number of vacancies. The 
matching function is strictly increasing but concave in both arguments and displays constant 
returns to scale. It follows that the labour market tightness is given by uvii /=θ , where the 
subscript { }sfi ,∈ , with f = formal and s = shadow, denotes the type of firm (see below). 
Hence, ( ) { } { }1,1/ , −=≡ iiii mvuvq θθ m  and ( ) { } { }1,/ , iii muuvg θθ =≡ m , with { }sfi ,∈ , are 
the probability of filling a vacancy and of finding a job, respectively.2 
We consider two types of firms, thus forming two sectors. Formal firms (with fi = ) 
have to pay taxes τ , whereas shadow firms (with si = ) enjoy tax evasion. 
To ensure that unemployment exists in steady state, it is assumed that job destruction 
occurs at the exogenous rate δ . Furthermore, since the underground activities are detected 
and repressed by the government at the exogenous rate ρ , the overall job destruction rate in 
the shadow sector is ( )ρδ + . Therefore, in steady state these matching and job destruction 
rates allow us to describe labour market flows: 
( ) ( ) fsfff nnngn ⋅−−−⋅= δθ 1&                          (1) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ssfss nnngn ⋅+−−−⋅= ρδθ 1&             (2) 
where fn  and sn  are the steady state employment rates, and unn sf =−−1  is the 
unemployment identity. 
The Bellman equations specified to find infinite horizon steady-state solutions are: 3 
Value of … Underground sector Regular sector 
a vacancy ( ) ( )sssss VJqcrV −⋅+−= θ  ( ) ( )fffff VJqcrV −⋅+−= θ  
a filled job ( ) ( )sssss JVwyrJ −⋅++−= ρδ  ( )fffff JVwyrJ −⋅+−−= δτ  
                                                 
2 Standard technical assumptions are assumed, i.e. lim θ → 0 q(θ) = lim θ → ∞ g(θ) = ∞, and lim θ → 0 g(θ) = lim θ → ∞ 
q(θ) = 0. 
3 The unemployed cannot search for jobs in both sectors at the same time (i.e. there is a directed search). However, 
irrespective of the sector, if an unemployed person fails to find a job, s/he falls back into the same unemployment 
pool. 
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searching for a job ( ) ( )ssss UWgbrU −⋅+= θ  ( ) ( )ffff UWgbrU −⋅+= θ  
being employed ( ) ( )ssss WUwrW −⋅++= ρδ  ( )ffff WUwrW −⋅+= δ  
 
where r is the exogenous discounted rate; ci is the vacant job cost; yi is the match 
productivity, wi is the wage rate and b is the benefit of being unemployed. 
As usual (see Pissarides, 2000), the equilibrium value of labour market tightness in 
both sectors is given by the free-entry condition or zero profit condition (i.e. Vi = 0) for firms. An 
explicit form of tightness can be obtained by using the Cobb-Douglas specification of 
matching function, i.e. aaii uvm ⋅=
−1  (with 10 << a ), which is usual in the literature 
(Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001): 4 
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with ( )∞∈ ,0iθ i∀ , because of the positive and finite parameters, and 0<∂∂ τθ /f , 
0<∂∂ ρθ /s , 0
22 >∂∂ τθ /f , 0
22 >∂∂ ρθ /s  (note that 0>−− τff wy  and 0>− ss wy  are 
necessary conditions to ensure that regular and shadow production takes place). 
As usual, wages are the outcome of a bilateral matching problem described by the 
Nash bargaining solution, 
( ) ( ){ } ( )
( )
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β
βββ
1
1maxarg ,   with { }sfi  ,∈                  (5) 
where ( )1 0,∈iβ  is the bargaining  power of workers. 
Therefore, for given policy parameters τ  and ρ , equations (1) – (5) together with the 
unemployment identity define a steady state equilibrium (with 0== sf nn && ). 
Now we derive the optimal level of taxation τ  and monitoring ρ  in a context in 
which a policy-maker maximizes the social output, where the latter also includes the output 
and the vacancy cost in the shadow sector. Furthermore, we consider the case in which 
taxation is used by the benevolent social planner to finance the benefit of being unemployed, 
i.e. τ=⋅ub . Following the textbook of Pissarides (2000), the social welfare function for an 
                                                 
4 The matching function (i.e. the matching elasticity) of the two sectors may differ, but evidence is lacking in this 
regard. 
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infinitely-lived economy is equal to the net output per job, minus vacancies costs, plus the 
benefit of being unemployed. The policy-maker thus maximizes the following programme: 5 
( )[ ]∫
∞
− +⋅⋅−⋅⋅−⋅+⋅−=Ω
0
  dtucucnynye ssffssff
rt τθθτ  
subject to: 
( ) fff nugn ⋅−⋅= δθ&  
( ) ( ) sss nugn ⋅+−⋅= ρδθ&  
sf nnu −−=1  
Let λ  and µ  be co-state variables (i.e. the shadow values) at the time t , so that the Hamiltonian 
(H) is: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
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The solution to this dynamic maximization problem requires that: 6 
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From the previous conditions, the result of interdependence between the optimal choice of 
taxation and the optimal choice of monitoring is straightforward, since conditions (I) – (IV) 
set up a set of four equations of four unknowns (τ , ρ , λ , µ ). Furthermore, the sign of the 
relationship between taxation and monitoring crucially depends on λ  and µ . 
In steady state (with 0== µλ && ), by using (III) and (IV) algebraic manipulations give: 
( )
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5 The social planner is not interested in wages, since wages only determine the output’s distribution and 
distributional considerations are excluded from the social welfare function. Furthermore, the social planner is 
subject to the same matching constraints as firms and workers. Hence, the evolution of employment constrains 
social choices as well as private ones. 
6 Besides lim t → ∞ λ · e –rt · nf  = 0 and lim t → ∞ µ · e –rt · ns  = 0. 
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with 0>λ , 0>µ , and, 
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under the following two conditions: (i) 0=−− sf yy τ , which is no better than an 
equilibrium condition, namely, in equilibrium an entrepreneur operates indifferently in one 
of the two sectors if sf yy =−τ ; 7 (ii) ( )δ+r  is sufficiently small, which is a realistic 
condition since small calibration values are usual in the literature. More precisely, ( )δ+r  
ranges between 0.112 (Shimer, 2005) and 0.18 (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006). 
Therefore, total differentiation of condition (II) gives: 8 
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7 Wages depend on the bargaining power of workers and labour market tightness. Therefore, it is not necessarily 
true that wf > ws. 
8 The sign of ∂λ/∂τ and ∂λ/∂ρ remains indeterminate. 
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Eventually, we obtain a negative relationship between taxation and monitoring policy if sc  
is sufficiently small (very realistic); whereas, the relationship could be positive if sc  were 
sufficiently large (not very realistic).9 As a result, from the social welfare standpoint, two 
options are available to the policy maker: s/he may either substitute a tighter monitoring 
with a higher fine (the penalty is usually assessed on the level of taxes) or enforce both a 
higher taxation and an increased monitoring (this could be recommended in countries like 
Italy where public spending is very inelastic, public debt is very large and tax morale is very 
low). 
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